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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HENRY C. DEHM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 13964

vs0
YVONNE G. DEHM,
Defendant-Respondent,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to terminate the payment of alimony
to respondent and would abort any obligation on his part
toward the support of his twin 18 year old daughters who
are mentally retarded and incapable of self-support.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On August 14, 1973, appellant filed a motion (R23)
to reduce or eliminate the award of $300.00 per month ordered paid to respondent as alimony by the decree of divorce
dated June 5, 1967 (R18-22). Appellant assigned the earning
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ability of respondent since the decree of divorce as being
the sole "substantial" change of circumstance warranting
the granting of his motion.
Respondent filed an answer and counter-motion on
September 21, 1973 (R25-31)0

Respondent by her answer

makes specific reference to her work program, her schooling, her salary and various activities since June, 1967,
through July 1, 1973.

Respondent alleges that the decree

of divorce and the findings of fact entered on June 5,
1967 (Rll-22) contemplate an earning capacity on her part
in order to augment the alimony and support provisions•
The findings of fact entered on June 5, 1967 (No. 7, R14)
recounts respondent's work program from the time of the
marriage until appellant obtained his college education
which included a Ph.D. Degree at the University of Wisconsin.
During this period respondent worked part-time as a secretary while completing her own education.

She contributed

her talents and resources to the marriage and at the time
of the divorce was employed on a part-time basis receiving
a gross salary of $220o00 per month (No. 5, R13).
The twin daughters of the marriage, born August 6,

-2-
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1956, are in the care, custody and control of respondent
by virtue of the divorce decree.

By respondent1s answer

to appellant's motion it is alleged that the children are
not capable of adult responsibility (R28).

Respondent

asked that the support for the children be increased from
$162.50 per month per child to $300.00 per month per child
and that alimony be increased to $500.00 per month.

She

also asked that the insurance program be continued for an
indefinite period, for attorney's fees and costs and that
the decree of divorce be amended accordingly.
There was no responsive pleading filed by appellant
to the counter-motions.

There was no denial of the allega-

tion that the children created additional burdens in their
care and maintenance.
of custody.

Appellant did not urge any change

Appellant did not ask that a general guardian

or guardian ad litem be appointed.

Appellant takes the

position that regardless of the incapacity of the children,
the Court in a divorce proceeding is without "jurisdiction"
to award support beyond the chronological age of majority.
The trial court in the instant action denied respondent's claim for increase in alimony, for an increase in

-3-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

support payments and refused to grant attorney's fees
and court costs.

In a very comprehensive memorandum deci-

sion (R58) the trial court made the following rulings:
"1.
Modify decree to provide that obligation
of the plaintiff for support of children to
continue indefinitely and is not to terminate
upon children reaching chronological majority.
2.
Alimony payment to remain as is. Not
increased or decreased. No modification.
3.
No modification as to child support.
Plaintiff to continue taking children as tax
deduction.
4.
Medical and hospitalization insurance
requirement of divorce decree to be modified
so plaintiff continues to carry same, based upon
the apparently irreversible mental condition of
the children, they will be dependents it appears
into future.
5.
Plaintiff to continue life insurance with
children as beneficiaries.0Gnot to change the
life insurance trust to put out children as
beneficiaries..primary beneficiaries.
6.
Each party to pay own attorney's fees.
Defendant now has substantial job and income
on job..able to save money and invest money.
Court finds that there has been changes in circumstances of parties.
1.
2.
3.

Plaintiff income has increased.
Plaintiff remarried but new wife
has income.
Defendant now employed and professional

-4-
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4.

5.
6.

and has substantial salary.
Now appears children will always
be dependents. Cost, time and
trouble of caring for children has
substantially increased due to their
mental incapacities and disabilities.
Children no longer need private
tutoring.
Children incompetent.11

The formal order of modification was signed and entered by the court on November 7, 1974 (R41-43).

Among

other things, the court in its findings of November 7, 1974,
specifically found that the children are now and since the
entry of the decree of divorce have been incompetent and
will always be dependents irrespective of their chronological
age of 18 years or older (R35).
Appellant's motion to amend findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce and for a new trial
was filed November 20, 1974, thirteen days after the court's
formal judgment.

The motion is dated November 18, 1974,

with a mailing certificate of the same date (R45-48). Appellant's motion was heard by the trial court on December
18, 1974 (R49).

The notice of appeal is dated January 20,

1975 (R50).

-5-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent would have this Court affirm the rulings
of the trial court in all respects,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant ignores the record in his statement of
facts with reference to the incapacity of the children*
Appellant departs from the record in attributing to respondent testimony purportedly contained in Exhibit 1-P to the
effect that she would be contented with her earnings of
$220.00 per month claiming that her first responsibility
was to her handicapped girls and that a sitter would not
supply a proper emotional climate.
Exhibit 1-P is the transcript of the testimony at
the time of the divorce.
evidence (R33,63, 68-75).

The exhibit was not admitted in
The objection to the exhibit was

to the effect that all of the evidence adduced at the time
of the trial of the divorce action became merged in the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce
(R69-70).

The objections and the ruling of the court in

excluding Exhibit 1-P were in accord with the holding of

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this Court in Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620
(1972)o

In that case the evidence before the court prior

to the decree was held to be "merged in the decree, (is)
res judicata, *

*

*

and hence cannot be considered in

determining the modification of the alimony award11.
The findings made and entered by the court in June,
1967, and referred to above do not negate the intention of
respondent to augment her income.

The necessity for res-

pondent to augment her income in order to live within the
standard of living equated by her talents and that of her
former husband was calculated and is obvious.
Appellant totally ignores the testimony of Dr.
Anthony J. LaPray, child psychologist (R76).

The inade-

quacies of the children are briefly stated by Dr. LaPray
by way of summary in Exhibit 2-D as follows:
"In summary, both of these girls are retarded
and will never be able to live an independent
life. They will need constant supervision by
their mother or another caretaker. They will
never be able to cope with the responsibilities
of a family or children, and will probably need
supervision of the type given in a group home
for the retarded, or an institution for the retarded. They will never be able to handle financial or household responsibilities.11

-7-
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Dr. LaPrayfs letter, Exhibit 2-D, dated November
3, 1973, was used in connection with a stipulation between
the parties and an order made by the court on the 23rd day
of November, 1973., relating to sterilization of the children
(R76-77).

The sterilization was stipulated to as a matter

of therapeutic necessity (R79).

Dr. LaPray testified that

the children would require specialized care throughout
their lives (R86).
As to the earning capacity of the children, it was
Dr. LaPray's uncontradicted opinion that working as waitresses at the Granite School District Rehabilitation Center was
a very minimal type of job, one that could only be equated
or considered under a sheltered environment.

They could

not operate as waitresses outside of that environment.

The

children are unable to prepare their meals or take care of
their own personal hygiene (R90)0
The children will never be able to learn how to
cook or to function independently and while their mental
age has been stated generally in terms of I.Q., actually
their I.Q. age is higher than their abilities in terms of
vocational tasks (R91).

While Dr. LaPray does not feel that
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the children should be institutionalized such as American
Fork, he does negate the concept of their becoming independent and states as his opinion that they should not be
removed from the custody of their mother (R95-96).
Appellantfs salary with Hercules Powder Company is
$2,200.00 per month (R101) as compared with his net takehome pay per month of $1,300.00 at the time of the divorce.
On direct examination Mr. Dehm admitted to having bonus
payments of $3,200.00 in addition to salary for the prior
year and that his present wife has a salary of $500.00 per
month (R103-104)o

Respondent estimated the cost of support

at $300.00 per month per child (R129) with the cost of babysitters at the rate of $15.00 per day plus board (R127).
From the time of the divorce appellant took the
children only one time and then for a period of five nights*
Appellant's refusal to take the children on other occasions
was predicated upon the proposition that his present wife
had two adult children of her own and that she had refused
to baby-sit her own grandchildren and was not going to act
in that capacity with regard to Mr. Dehmfs children (R132).
Mrs. Dehm has a comprehensive trust agreement with

-9-
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a will in favor of the children Exhibits 7-D and 8-D
funded by life insurance policies in the face amount of
some $54,000.00 but with declining values and which costs
respondent by way of premiums $1,048.00 per year (Rill).
The burden of the children compounded by respondents
work requirements and travel in and outside of the State of
Utah is comprehensively outlined by her in support of the
estimated cost of $300.00 per month per child (R127-129)
which testimony was undisputed.

Respondent's gross salary

in her capacity with the State of Utah as Occupational Program Consultant, Division of Alcholosm and Drugs is $946.00
per month (R114).

Mrs* Dehm has been frugal in the conserva-

tion of relatively minor assets which include the home
allocated to her by the decree of divorce subject to a
mortgage.

Counsel overlooks the allocation to respondent

by the decree of June 5, 1967, of an automobile, a credit
union savings in the amount of $557.00, $1,500.00 in cash,
a membership in the Salt Lake Swimming and Tennis Club and
personal effects (R20).

The gross amount received by res-

pondent by way of her earnings, the alimony and child support
less respondent's financial contribution to the children do

-10-
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not total the family cash flow of $1,500.00 per month as
of the time of the divorce and the standard of living
equated to the living costs at said time.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IGNORING THE CHRONOLOGICAL AGE
OF THE CHILDREN SO FAR AS OBLIGATIONS FOR SUPPORT ARE CONCERNED.
Appellant cites Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 330,
172 P.2d 132 (1946), construing Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953), to the effect that the statute without exception
relates to minor children.

The Anderson case was decided some

eleven years prior to the Uniform Civil Liability Act for Support, Section 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 Utah Code Annotated,
passed in 1957*
Support Act.

We will refer to this Act as the Uniform
Section 6 of Section 78-45-6 Utah Code Annotated

provides:
"District court jurisdiction. - The district court
shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought
under this act.11
Section 8 is as follows:
"Section 78-45-8, Utah Code Annotated, Continuing
jurisdiction. - The court shall retain jurisdiction
to modify or vacate the order of support where justice
requires. "
-11-
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In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 70 Utah 274, 259 P. 925 (1927),
it was held that in a divorce action it was proper to quiet
title to property awarded to the parties.

This was on the

theory that the court merely did what was incidental and
proper in the allocation of the property.

In Larsen v.

Paynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785 (1943), reference is
made to Article 8, Section 19, Constitution of Utah to
the effect that there shall be but one form of civil action,
and law and equity may be administered in the same action.
In elaboration of this principle the court stated:
"No particular form of action or proceeding is
either necessary or required to set in motion
the processes of the court when the parties are
before it and the court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter. It is the substance and not the
form that controls. Utah Association of Credit
Men v. Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029.
*

'k

-k

*

The trial court in the divorce proceeding could
have made or in this action may make a partition
or division of the property and quiet title in
the respective parts of the property and thereby
finish the controversy. Hyrup v. Hyrup, 70 Utah
274, 259 P. 925.
•k

*

-k

*k

The court having retained jurisdiction of the sub-
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ject matter and both parties being before it, the
task left unfinished should now upon this application be finished.11
Section 78-45-2 Utah Code Annotated (Uniform Support
Act), sub-paragraph 4 in defining "child11 means one who is
incapacitated from earning a living and is without sufficient
means.

Section 78-45-7 of the Act specifies but without

limitation the relevant factors to be considered by the
court in determining the amount due for support which includes the standard of living, the relative wealth and income, the ability of the obligor (Mrc Dehm) to earn and
the age of the parties.
Page 12 of appellant's brief would have it appear
that Section 9 of the Act gives the right of enforcement
to the child or the State Department of Public Welfare.
Fortunately for all concerned including the harrassed tax
payer, the State Department of Public Welfare has not had
to support the children and so far as an action by the children is concerned, appellant made no request for a guardian,
being content, undoubtedly, that his former wife was a woman
of integrity and would use the money for the support of the
children.

-13-
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The Court has before it the parties directly responsible and the vehicle of a divorce action is merely a
procedureal vehicle.

The district court is a court of

general jurisdiction and the Uniform Support Act is in
addition to the rights already afforded the district court.
On page 7 of appellant's brief he states that the
Supreme Court of the United States in Stanton v. Stanton,
43 Law Ed. 2d 688 (April 15, 1975) did no more than reverse
on constitutional grounds. We challenge this concept for
the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States
specifically characterized the appellant mother as fla fiduciary11 on the suggestion that the support issue was moot
in this respect.

Direct reference is made to the Uniform

Support Act.
Last but not least is the action of the 1975 Legislature in amending Section 15-2-11 Utah Code Annotated (1953),
wherein it is now provided that minority extends to males
and females to the age of 18.

It is further provided by

the amendment that in divorce actions the court may order
support to 21.
Section 78-45-12 of the Uniform Support Act to the

-14-
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effect that the rights are in addition to those presently
existing and not in substitution brings into focus the
statement of the Court in Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d
436, 491 P.2d 273 (1971):
"For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders
in divorce proceedings are of a different and
higher character than judgments in suits at
law; and by their nature are better suited to
the purpose of protecting the interests and
welfare of children.
*

*

*

*

Based upon what we have said herein it is our conclusion that where it appears to be in furtherance
of the court's responsibility of safeguarding the
welfare of children, the District Court may upon
conditions which he deems appropriate and consistent with that objective, make an order such as
the one here under attack, staying the issuance
of an execution. When this is done, consonant
with the usual rule of review in equitable matters,
his action will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it clearly and persuasively appears that he abused
his discretion.11

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ELIMINATE OR
REDUCE ALIMONY.
In the foregoing statement of facts the record is
documented to the effect that the respondent in her present
occupation has a gross salary of $946.00 per month as compared

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with her gross salary of $220o00 per month on a part-time
basis at the time of the decree of divorce in June, 1967.
Appellant has a gross salary of $2,200.00 per month (R101)
with Hercules Powder Company as compared with a net salary
of $1,300.00 per month in June of 1967. Appellant's salary
is in addition to bonus payments which amount to $3,200.00
in 1973 (R103).

By the decree of divorce appellant takes

all tax advantages which include the children as dependents
and alimony0

Respondent's scholastic and post graduate

efforts are documented by her answer and counter-motions in
the instant matter (R26-27)c

Respondent's testimony is un-

contradicted to the effect that the cost incident to the
care and maintenance of the permanetly dependent twin
daughters is $300.00 per month each.
Christensen v0 Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 414
P.2d 511 (1968), a case not cited by appellant, holds that
the wife in a relatively long marriage is not always entitled
to alimony.

Alimony is one of the factors to be considered

with all of the other incidents of the marriage in making
an adjustment which the court deems just and equitable between
the parties.
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"This is also true of the relative guilt, or
perhaps better stated, the greater responsibility
one spouse may appear to have than the other for
bringing about the failure of the marriage."
The Christensen case is quoted at some length in
Pickens v. Pickens, 24 Utah 2d 409, 473 P.2d 397 (1970),
a case where the marriage was endured for less than four
months and each party was guilty of mistreatment toward
the other and no alimony was awarded.

The quotation from

the Christensen case is as follows:
"'Whether we as individual judges would or
would not have arrived at the exact same formula
as to what the most practical and just treatment
of the economic aspects of this situation is not
the question on this appeal. Even though it is
the established rule that divorce cases being in
equity, it is the duty of this court to review
and weigh the evidence, it is equally true that
we have invariably recognized the advantaged position of the trial judge and given deference to
his findings and judgment, declaring that they
should not be upset unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against them, or unless the decree
works such an injustice that equity and good conscience demand that it be revised *
*
*.'"
Appellant cites King v. King, 27 Utah 2d 303, 495
P.2d 823 (1972), as being "somewhat analogous" to the instant
matter. Mrs. King appealed from the judgment modifying the
alimony payment from $250.00 per month to $100.00 per month
for a period of six months and thereafter to the sum of $50.00
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per month for a period of one year and thereafter to terminate.

This Court affirmed the iudgment but directed the

court below to provide for alimony in a nominal sum rather
than its termination.
The prior appeal in the King case, 25

Utah 2d 163,

478 P.2d 492 (1970) was by the defendant husband, a 22 year
old employee of Kennecott with an income of between $470.00
and $490.00 per month.

The contention was that the former

wife at the time of the divorce was physically unable to
work and subsequently her condition in that respect changed.
There is no similarity to the instant case and appellant in
so indicating goes outside of the record in his reference
to Exhibit 1-P.
In Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 PG2d 155 (1973),
the trial court was reversed having reduced the former wife's
alimony from $600000 a month to $1.00 a yearG

The earnings

of the wife at the time of the petition for modification
amounted to approximately $7,000000 per year in the public
health field.

The husband was a physician earning a little

over $29,000.00 per year.

The former wifefs duties required

her to travel to Hawaii, Arizona and throughout California.

-18-
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She had burdens of consequence with her children.

The

case reviews in detail other expressions of this Court
including the following.
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 PG2d
308 (1971), is cited in the Ring case to the effect that
when neither party has appealed from the decree of divorce
it must be assumed that the decree is a fair and equitable
disposition of property as well as the requirements for
alimony and support money.

The Court in the Ring case

stated the following:
"Defendant must furthermore sustain the burden
of proving that there has been a substantial
change in the material circumstances of either
one or both of the parties since the decree was
entered. In the recent cases of Allen v. Allen
(25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970) and Short
v. Short (25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971)
this court affirmed the order of the trial court,
denying modification of alimony, where at the time
of the decree was granted, the parties contemplated
that the wife would secure employment and contribute to her own support.11
The Ring case also comments on Felt v. Felt, supra,
to the effect that the wife's income is not an absolute
factor in determining whether there has been a change of
circumstances warranting modification of alimony.

This is

closer to the present situation than anything urged by appel-
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lant.

Mrc Dehm seeks to modify the decree solely upon the

demonstrated earning capacity of his former wife since the
decree of divorce.

There is no other fact or circumstance

leading to "manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity11
which MrG Dehm, the moving party on the alimony issue, had
the burden of showing.
We do not belabor this point, there being nothing
in the record to indicate an abitrary ruling on the part
of the trial court and to the contrary the uncontradicted
evidence clearly supports the retention of alimonyG
;

POINT III

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING ON EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT
TO APPELLANT'S EARNINGS OR THAT OF HIS PRESENT SPOUSE.
Appellant called as a witness on his own behalf
testified in accordance with questions propounded by Mr Q
Roe,
l!

Q.

Can you tell us what your salary is at the
present time?

Ac

Itfs $2,200o00 a month (R101).
*

Q.

*

*

*

Did you receive a bonus last year?
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A.

Yes.

Q0

And how much was that?

A.

It was $3,200.00 (R103).
*

*

-k

Jc

Q.

Have you remarried since the divorce?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And when was that?

A.

It was in September, 1967.

Q.

Is your wife working at the present time?

A.

Yes.

Qo

Do you know what she makes in the way
of income?

A,

Her gross is, I believe, $500.00 per
month (R104)."

The above matters were volunteered by appellant
and it seems strange he would now claim error in those
respects.
As to the contention that the trial court erroneously
sustained an objection to MrQ Dehm's testifying with reference
to the condition of his home, this was a voluntary and irrelevant part of Mr. Dehmfs testimony offered in his case in
chief.
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]

n
We again reiterate the fact that Mr. Dehm's petition

1

to modify was based solely on his former wife's present earning capacityo

There was no responsive pleading filed in

connection with Mrs. Dehm's counter-motions but in any event
•
the ruling of the trial court was not conclusive or prejudicial. I
^i

We point to portions of the record following the quoted
portion as found on page 18 of appellant's brief:
"MR, ROE:

•

Some of this may come in by way
of rebuttal.

I

THE COURT:

YesG It may do on that matter,
Mrc Roe.

I

MR. ROE:

And I'd just as soon leave that for
rebuttal, if the Court will please.
In response to their case I may be
anticipating just a little (R105)."

I

The condition of MrQ Dehm's home was never there-

fl

I
-

after pursued and we submit that the voluntary statement
of appellant adduced by his own counsel cannot be assigned

I

as error.

•

POINT IV
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED AND THIS APPEAL
WAS NOT TAKEN WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT AND ORDERS COMPLAINED OF.
In advocating his motion for a new trial, appellant
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I

merely reiterates his concept of no support for the children after their majority, the findings with respect to his
own earning capacity and that of his present wife and other
matters that we believe to be amply

covered by the foregoing.

There is one problem that goes to the "jurisdiction"
of this Courto

The amendment to the decree of divorce and

orders pertaining thereto was dated and filed November 7,
1974 (R41-43).

Appellant's motions to amend the findings

and for a new trial were filed November 20, 1974 (R45) with
a certificate of mailing dated November 18, 1974 (R48)0

The

10th day from the entry of the amendment to the decree fell
on a Sunday and appellant had all day on Monday, the 18th of
November to serve his motion for a new trial. The question
is whether Rule 59 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that a motion for a new trial be filed not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment.
In Vanjonora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d
1320 (1974), the Court held that the order of dismissal as
to the defendant, Harvey Draper, made and entered on December
21, 1972, was a final order not withstanding a motion dated
January 4, 1973, and filed with the clerk of the court on
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January 5, 1973. The motion was considered as a motion for
a new trial but was held to be abortive as to Draper, not
having been "timely filed" and therefore not tolling the
time for appeal.
In Watson Vo Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d
1003 (1973), there was no motion for a new trial but Rule
59 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is specifically referred to as providing "that a motion for a new trial must be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment11,
but the opinion concludes with the language "In as much as
there was no motion for a new trial timely filed, the time
of appeal expired one month from July 9, 1971, and the attempted appeal filed December 27, 1971, is not timely, and
this court, therefore did not acquire jurisdiction to consider the matter.", (emphasis added)
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d
843 (1970), it is stated "Defendant's motion for a new trial
was not timely filed", (emphasis added)
We repeat that the motion for a new trial in the instant matter was filed 13 days after the judgment and orders
appealed from.

If it is the filing date that controls then
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we are not concerned with the troublesome problem as to
whether the certificate of mailing dated November 18, 1974,
can be equated with service of the notice within the 10 day
period.
CONCLUSION
With all due respect to counsel, appellant has no
standing of consequence before this Court and the rulings
of the trial court should be confirmed in their entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Harley W. Gustin
GUSTIN & GUSTIN
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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